



TACARE NEWSLETTER

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EDITORIAL

This current issue of TACARE Newsletter has collected nine cases reported by various personnel from the aviation bodies as well as the passengers. Five out of nine were flight operations issues:

- Dispatch of flight crew during the Chinese New Year
- Regulatory compliance of the utilization of FOQA data of an airline
- Captain seating on the right-hand seat performing the right hand's duty
- Pilot's comment on the checklist implementation
- Pilot's suggestions regarding switching runway prior to landing

The other four were cabin related issues:

- Regulation pertaining to whether flight attendants should stand when demonstration video being played
- Regulation of dangerous goods such as cell phone batteries
- Conducts of crew members within cabin
- Speed limitations during taxiing

In addition, to share with our readers with more valuable information, we excerpted two cases from Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) of the United States of America, which included cabin and maintenance.

- Heating bags for Meals Ready to Eat (MRE)
- Wheel Spacer maintenance problems for Boeing 767

It has always been the goal of TACARE to uphold the spirit of "confidential, non-punitive, neutral, reliable, and professional" so as to provide an open forum where information can be freely exchanged. Through the collection, analysis, and sharing of information, we aim to gradually eliminate lurking risk factors that may impede aviation safety and enhance Taiwan's aviation safety. It is our sincere hope that our readers will continue to provide us with supports and affirmation, as well as enthusiastically offer us suggestions regarding aviation safety, so that we may together elevate Taiwan's aviation safety.

FROM OUR READERS

Recently, TACARE task force received a phone call from Mr. Ching-Nien Chen, Manager of Flight Standards and Training Department of Flight Operations Division of UNI AIR. Mr. Chen expressed his comments on "Reports – Passengers Not Seated During Pushback and Taxi – TACARE Office Comments – 3. After reviewing several airlines' Cabin Crew Operations Manuals, there is no such rule that airplane cannot move on the ground unless all passengers were seated," published on the eighth issue of TACARE Newsletter. Mr. Chen informed us that both the Cabin Attendant's Operation Manual and

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the Flight Operations Manual of UNI AIR clearly and strictly require that the pushback may proceed only after all passengers being seated, and “Cabin Secured” signal sent out to cockpit by purser.

After checking on the Cabin Attendant’s Operation Manual and Flight Operations Manual of UNI AIR, we agreed with what Mr. Chen said. UNI AIR does have the above-mentioned regulation. We would like to thank Mr. Chen for his comment and make a correction herewith. We hope this could be useful information to other carries.

REPORTS

Dispatch of Flight Crew During the Chinese New Year

An airline’s flight attendant reported that during the Chinese New Year, the airline he/she serves often flies unscheduled flights during nighttime bound for various destinations in Asia. The reporter has been on duty multiple times for such unscheduled flights. Sometimes the flights carry passengers on both the to and from legs of the trip, and sometimes only one leg of the trip will carry passengers. On the return leg of the trip, the reporter has always been very fearful. Because even it was in the early A.M. hours, the company still adheres strictly to the normal dispatch rules; only a standard cockpit crew will be dispatched. The reporter thinks that this is a significant threat to aviation safety because even experienced pilots cannot fight the physical fatigue. The heavy workload during the Chinese New Year coupled with the fact that the crew on those extended duties must report for duty at night and work to the early morning makes these flights all the more precarious. When the reporter is on duty for these extra flights, he/she is exhausted by the time the airplane reaches its destination. It is difficult to imagine, therefore, how a standard crew dispatch could endure flying up to ten hours without rest.

TACARE Office

After the TACARE task force received this report, the CAA and the airline were immediately contacted. The responses and the handling of the situation are described below:

The CAA

During the audit coordination meeting between the CAA and the airlines, the airlines were asked to strengthen self-monitoring procedures during the Chinese New Year by drafting a plan and submit to the CAA. In addition, the airlines were asked to place special emphases on crew schedules, rest time and crew pairing.

The Airline

The arrangement of flight schedules, as well as flight/duty/rest times are all complied with the FOM (Flight Operations Manual) and related regulations. To reduce risks, any flight that departs between 2100 and 0700 local time with standard crew aboard shall not exceed eight hours (two hours less than what is currently designated). During the Chinese New Year holiday season, extra nighttime flights will be added to regular schedules to accommodate customers’ demands. However, pilots will be given adequate time to rest in order to carry out their duties under favorable conditions.



Regulatory Compliance of the Utilization of FOQA data of an airline

According to a reporter, the FOQA management rules of one of the airlines stipulate that any unusual event revealed in FOQA data, will be recorded in the captain’s record no matter he/she was PF or not, and full responsibility will be accorded thereof.

Concern has been expressed that since the captain and first officer take turns to serve the position of PF or PNF, each position has it’s own responsibility and

tasks to do. But after the above rules were set forth, captain and first officer could sometimes be seen simultaneously being on control in the airplane. When the captain hands over control to the first officer, due to his lack of complete confidence in the first officer, he will sometimes try to help by pushing the rudder or pulling the control stick, which could compromise flight safety.

The reporter expressed that although the airline clearly states that the FOQA data will not be used as disciplinary action against pilots, the fact that adding the record of unusual events to a pilot's personal record is a kind of disciplinary action in itself. In addition, to avoid events being triggered out from the FOQA system, some pilots have begun to deviate from standard flight deliberation and procedures. As pilots make the avoidance of unusual records a priority, the entire objective of the FOQA system is jeopardized.

TACARE Office

1. The airline's flight safety office responded that their job is to read out the FOQA data and then pass it to each fleet and other related departments such as flight operations department. However, the ways that each department deals with the FOQA data have always been a controversial issue. Currently, the airline's policy is to ask the person involved to strengthen the skill via simulator training when handling the serious event. If this is viewed in a negative perspective the pilots may feel that they are being punished. But when viewed in a positive perspective, this can be deemed as an opportunity for the pilot to strengthen his/her abilities, and improve aviation safety. Presently, the pilot will be punished if and only if they persist in conducting an unstable approach.
2. The TACARE task force has in the past received

several reports expressing concerns with how FOQA data is utilized. The utilization of FOQA data remains a controversial topic. Even though the ultimate goal is to improve flight safety, less-than-meticulous management of FOQA data utilization may nonetheless lead to negative consequences. TACARE task force only hopes to make airlines aware of this delicate issue. If the management was able to understand their employees' concerns, the lines of communication may be opened between the two parties. By examining the problem, utilization of FOQA data may be improved as a consensus between the management and its employees is reached.



Captain Seating on the Right-Hand Seat Performing the Right Hand's Duty

It was reported that most of the flights which currently bound for Southeast Asia are round-trip mission, and the company usually dispatches three pilots (usually two captains plus one F/O) when the flight hour is long.

When the first officer is off, one of the captains must sit in the right seat. The reporter's concern was that the captain might be less familiar with operations from such a seating arrangement, safety therefore is negatively affected. The FOM stipulates that prior to a pilot's acceptance of responsibility to a duty station, he must first be trained and qualified. It is unknown whether all captains who occupy the right-hand seat have complied with this regulation, and the clear answers could not be obtained after direct inquiries were made to the airline.

TACARE Office

1. After reviewing the airline's FOM, it was ascertained that pilots do indeed need to be trained and qualified before accepting CM1 (left seat) or CM2 (right seat) duty stations.

2. Normally speaking, captains were trained and promoted from the former position of first officers, and therefore should be familiar with operations from the right seat. However, if a captain has not operated in the right seat for a long period of time, they may inevitably feel unfamiliar with the right seat duty. In addition, some captains may have served as first officers only on one type of airplane and, having made a direct transfer to a new fleet as captain, may have had no experience on the right-hand seat of the new type of airplane. Therefore, a captain who has not passed the prerequisite training and qualifications should not be allowed to operate an airplane from the right seat.
3. After contacting one of the POIs of CAA, he stated that CAA is aware of this situation. During the audit coordination meeting in December 2003, airlines were asked to deliberate upon and submit rules related to the training and qualifications of captains who accept CM2 duty positions.

Pilot's Comment on the Checklist Implementation

In the early days, airlines required that first officers should recite the checklist to display professionalism. In recent years, however, checklist implementation is carried out in a step-by-step sequential manner in order to avoid mistakes.

During the simulator check ride, however, IP required a speedy performance, and time limitations were even established for certain tasks. IP expressed that they required a speedy performance only because there were too many tasks that needed to be done within the two-hour timeframe of the simulator check.

The reporter thought that accuracy is more important than speed when going through the checklist. However, discrepancy is creating when pilots are

required to perform tasks slowly and accurately during training and on line flights, and quickly during the simulator check ride.

TACARE Office

1. After contacting the airline, its flight safety office stated that for both training and on the line, the emphasis for checklist implementation would be on accuracy, not speed. However, the officer admitted that some IPs wish to conserve time during the simulator check ride, they will require test-takers to streamline and speed up their movements while carrying out the checklist, with the result that the examinees feel at a loss.
2. The airline expressed that since different flight instructors may proceed the procedures with different methodologies, the airline will ask training chiefs of each fleet to remind each IP during the IP meeting that emphasis for the checklist implementation is to be placed on accuracy, not on speed.

Pilot's Suggestions Regarding Switching Runway Prior to Landing

At around eight o'clock one evening, runway in use was from runway 23 switching to runway 05 at Chiang Kai-shek International Airport. An airplane approaching the airport first checked the ATIS at TNN, and ATIS was Information F, runway 23, and the wind was 320/5kts. As the airplane approaching BRAVO and once again checked the ATIS, the information had been changed to G, runway 23, and wind 030/5kts. At this point the airplane requested TPE Control for descend, but was only clear to decrease altitude for 2000 feet. By the time they passed BRAVO and hand over to TPE APP, the information had already been changed to H, runway 05 (with tailwind under 5kts). The ATC assigned the SHIKANG ONE BRAVO ARRIVAL (SA1B) approach, but did not allow the

airplane to lower the altitude, waiting until the airplane was quite close before giving permission to descend. This made the descent extremely difficult. The final landing was wind calm. Afterwards when other pilots present at the time were asked about the situation, they also shared endless complaints.

Suggestions made by the reporter are as follows:

1. When the tailwind is neither too strong nor tending to quickly increase in strength, there is no need to switch runways (Kaohsiung Airport always uses runway 09). If there is a need to switch runways, the change should only be made after the ATC controller has carefully planned how the adjustment is to be made. Sudden announcement of a runway change can adversely affect the airplane's navigation.
2. If it is necessary to switch runways, the announcement could be made earlier during the TPE Control. The ATC Controller only needs to say, "All stations CKS Airport change R/W to XX" to give all approaching airplane ample time to prepare. This will avoid the confusion experienced by the flight crew when airplane are first denied the permission to descend and then have to wait until transfer to the APP before being informed of switching runways.
3. If the control tower is overwhelmed, then airplane should not be allowed to continue their approach, but instead should vector the airplane out of the airspace and decrease altitude. If many airplanes are approaching from all sides, and some decrease while others increase altitude, the situation can transform into a dangerous one.

In addition, the following suggestions have been made in regards to CKS Airport's STARs:

1. Airplanes approaching from the south-using runway 05/06 should use the SA1B/SA1/TG1 approach, but from time to time it will be radar

vector. But since the radar-vector path conforms exactly to the SA1B/SA1/TG1 path, the radar vector is actually not necessary. All that is needed is the SA1B/SA1/TG1 path along with elevation suggestions from the control tower.

2. Airplanes approaching from the south using runway 23/24 have no STAR route to follow, and are almost never brought to the FRANK/FLASH points, not to mention points twenty miles away such as LAVOS. Sometimes airplanes are vectored in at the CF23/24 parallel, or sometimes even at the FF23/24 parallel, and almost all are radar-vector after the BRAVO point to SEDUM before being brought to the CF23/24 parallel. Since every landing is consistently radar vectored, a STAR diagram should be made available so that everyone can adhere to an established standard.
3. The STAR map for the northern approach has been updated many times, but I have yet to use even once. Instead, I always let radar vector directly orients me to the APU, and then a certain established heading such as 250 intercepts the final of runway 23/24. Or, a commonly used fixed heading will be used to the 05/06 parallel about 5 miles downwind, and fly downwind to approach from the base. Since the STAR path is never used, there is no need to announce the routes; and if radar vector always uses an established direction and position, then another STAR that are actually used should be created.

The purpose of the STAR is to reduce the burden on pilots and air traffic controller, and to allow both to have guidance to follow. The effectiveness of the current method of CKS Airport's ATC Controller can still be improved. These are my observations and suggestions, and I hope they will contribute in improving Taiwan's aviation safety.

TACARE Office

We thank the reporter for his knowledge and suggestions that have provided related departments with opportunities to improve the quality of service as well as enhance aviation safety. The TACARE task force has already passed the suggestions on to the CAA for further consideration and improvement.

Regulation Pertaining to Whether Flight Attendants Should Stand When Demonstration Video Being Played

Recently an airline has begun to require that flight attendants should stand at their assigned posts while the demonstration video of emergency evacuation procedures is being played. The reporter felt, however, that it is not only dangerous but also unnecessary to require flight attendants to stand during taxiing. The reporter wishes to inquire whether this rule is legal.

TACARE Office

1. The regulations of the CAA as well as the airline's manual do not specifically indicate that flight attendants must sit or stand while the demonstration video of emergency evacuation procedures is being played during taxiing.
2. The flight safety office of the airline stated that standing during taxiing indeed increases risk. They will communicate with the Cabin Crew Department to gain a better understanding of the situation.
3. In addition, during taxiing, pilots should keep in mind that cabin crew may not yet be seated, and should control taxi speed accordingly so as to reduce the incidence of risk.

Regulation of Dangerous Goods such as Cell Phone Batteries

A purser reported that after a certain flight reached its destination (overseas), the cabin crew completed the cabin checks and left the airplane. As the purser walked through the air bridge towards the boarding gate near the arrival hall, he/she saw on the floor a fire extinguisher and traces of fire. According to an outbound crew, a passenger's backpack suddenly caught on fire after he left the airplane. It is possible that a rechargeable cellular phone battery not packaged properly within the backpack was exposed to enough friction to induce flames. The reasons for the fire remain unclear, and airport staff did not take any further actions toward the passenger.

The purser expressed concern that if the passenger's backpack had burst into flames within the plane, the consequences may have been very serious. Therefore, in addition to reporting this incident to the airline, he also took advantage of TACARE Newsletter to make public the events surrounding this incident. Hopefully related organizations will be able to take further action to investigate whether any holes exist in current security checks and to preclude the possibility of future aviation occurrences.

TACARE Office

1. The Air Transport Division of the CAA stated that they supervise and manage civil air transport enterprise in conformity with the Civil Aviation Act of the Republic of China as well as international regulations. Regulations regarding the supervision and management of transporting dangerous goods are as follows:
 - a. Civil Aviation Act of the Republic of China, Article 43: Unless specifically permitted by CAA, airplane shall not carry firearms, ammunition, explosives, poison gas, radioactive materials or other articles hazardous to flight safety.
 - b. Regulation of Civil Air Transport Enterprise

Article 27: Civil air transport enterprise shall adopt the International Air Transport Association's regulations on disposition of dangerous goods, in transporting such goods.

2. Investigations show that rechargeable lithium batteries was classified to the ninth category of dangerous goods in the IATA DGR, and Article 2.3.5.10 deals with consumer electronic devices containing lithium or lithium ion cells or batteries when carried by passengers or crew for personal use. Spare batteries must be individually protected to prevent short circuits and carried in carry-on baggage only. In addition, each spare battery must not exceed the following quantities:
 - (a) for lithium metal or lithium alloy batteries, a lithium content of not more than 2 g; or
 - (b) for lithium ion batteries, an aggregate equivalent lithium content of not more than 8 g.

Lithium ion batteries with aggregate equivalent lithium content of more than 8 g but not more than 25 g may be carried in carry-on baggage if they are individually protected so as to prevent short circuits and are limited to two spare batteries per person.

3. Due to the fact that the airport did not take appropriate action following the incident, it remains unknown whether the lithium content of the battery and the number of batteries in the passenger's carry-on baggage exceeded IATA DGR. However, It can be anticipated that if the battery had been appropriately packaged and protected, the incident would not have occurred.
4. Few people have examined in detail the makeup and content of rechargeable cellular phone batteries, and even fewer are familiar with the stipulations of the IATA DGR. However, there exists a simple task that can be accomplished by

anyone, and which can effectively prevent fires caused by short circuits: whether you are aboard the airplane or not, in consideration of your own and others' safety, please use insulating materials to package and protect batteries so as to prevent the harm that could be caused by a short-circuit. Simple actions can bring about significant consequences. As you take heed of your own actions, please remember also to remind those around you to do the same.



Conducts of Crew Members Within Cabin

Upon boarding a flight with a certain airline, a passenger found the flight crew and purser chatting outside the cockpit amidst faint smells of cigarette smoke. The passenger would like to know whether it is legal for the pilot to leave the cockpit and chat with the purser. This passenger also felt that since smoking is prohibited for the passengers, it should also be prohibited for the flight crew. Did the purser simply pretend not to notice? The passenger said that although he is addicted to smoking, he can manage not to smoke for the duration of the flight – how could the flight crew responsible for the safety of all the travelers behave so irresponsibly?

TACARE Office

1. The TACARE task force was unable to determine whether the flight crew in question was on duty or not at the time. If he was on break, he is indeed allowed to leave the cockpit. In addition, the TACARE task force was also unable to ascertain whether the smoke detected by the passenger came from the flight crew.
2. Our purpose for printing this particular report is to remind all crewmembers that every action they made within the cabin may influence passengers' impressions towards the airline and themselves; therefore, please act with discretion at all times.



Speed Limitations During Taxiing

It has been reported that one flight of a certain airline taxied at a very high speed after landing. When the airplane was making a U-turn on the runway, the nose gear seemed to be skidding. After the U-turn, the airplane accelerated rapidly, and the top speed might have reached 80 km/hr; soon afterwards, the plane proceeded to quickly decelerate. The reporter felt that the taxiing speeds were far too high and very dangerous. He/She would like to know whether airlines have established speed limits during taxiing.

TACARE Office

1. According to the airline's FOM, the speed limit during taxiing is twenty knots (approximately 37 km/hr). While turning, the speed must be reduced to 10 knots (approximately 18.5 km/hr). When braking conditions are not ideal, speeds are not to exceed 5 knots (approximately 9.25 km/hr).
2. Pilots should take notice of their taxiing speed so that passengers do not feel unsafe.



CASES FROM OTHER COUNTRIES

Starting from the eighth issue, the TACARE task force has begun to select some useful reports that are worth of learning from other countries' voluntary reporting system to share with our readers. The reports this month have all been selected from the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) of the United States. A brief description of the system is included below.

ASRS (Aviation Safety Reporting System)

In May of 1975, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) first introduced the Aviation Safety Reporting

Program (ASRP) in which the identity of the reporter was kept confidential. However, since the FAA was the authority of civil aviation, reporters were afraid that submitting reports would lead to negative consequences for themselves; the system was therefore unsuccessful at the outset.

In an effort to overcome this barrier, in April of 1976 the FAA signed a memorandum of understanding with NASA which allowed NASA to serve as the middleman between the FAA and airlines, and which made NASA responsible for the administration of the program. NASA had chosen to operate the program through a contractor selected via competitive bidding, and the system was renamed the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). The current contractor is Battelle Memorial Institute.

Since NASA played a neutral role, they were able to take into consideration the delicate matter of human sensitivity, thereby allowing the ASRS to become extremely successful. The system has to this date received over 300,000 reports, and recently the number of reports has increased to an average of 3,153 cases per month. When compared with other voluntary reporting systems internationally, ASRS is at the head of the pack.



Heating Bags for Meals Ready to Eat (MRE)

Quick action by an MD-80 Cabin Crew dampened a passenger's unauthorized attempt to heat and eat.

The #4 Flight Attendant was the first person to detect a burning plastic smell... I walked up a few rows and then noticed the same smell she was describing. We immediately called the cockpit and then checked out the galley area and lavatories. While I stayed in the aft portion of the cabin, the #4 Flight Attendant went out to pick up trash and to see if the smell was apparent

throughout the cabin. In the aft part of plane we all smelled it and then noticed smoke coming from the trash bag that the #4 Flight Attendant had just brought back... Smoke was coming from an airsickness bag. We carefully opened it slightly and noticed a Styrofoam cup and a military, Meals, Ready to Eat (MRE) heating bag. A military passenger told another Flight Attendant that he was using it to cook the food he brought on board. We dumped the MRE heating device into a lavatory sink full of cold water, covered it with ice, and then locked the lavatory. It was still hot one and one-half hours later on landing. The passenger said he had done this before on other flights...

—ASRS Callback #282, March 2003

TACARE Office

According to the information gathered by the TACARE task force, Military, Meals, Ready to Eat (MRE) are specifically designed for military purposes. When regular army provisions are not available, MRE foods can be used as substitutes. As Fig.1 and 2 show, such MRE foods' packaging are similar to the prepackaged instant foods that can be bought in a market.



Fig.1



Fig.2

In order to make it possible for soldiers to eat hot, most MRE will add a heating bag. Such a heating bag (see Fig.3) does not require electricity or fire. The bag produces heat when filled with water (see Fig.4), and food can be warmed in about twenty minutes.

After reviewing the IATA DGR, this heating device has not been categorized as a dangerous good. But cases

reveal that these heating packs do possess the ability to ignite fire. Although this case occurred within the United States, an increasing number of compatriots are bringing their own food aboard and the instant foods with self-heating devices are becoming more and more common in markets. For this reason, through this report, TACARE task force hopes to not only remind aviation personnel to be cautious, but also to suggest passengers not to bring such heating devices aboard flights.



Fig.3



Fig.4

From The Maintenance Desk — Wheel Spacer Installing Problems for Boeing 767

Several recent ASRS maintenance reports have indicated a recurring problem regarding failure to install B767 wheel spacers. In some instances, it appears that the wheel spacer adheres to the grease on the inboard side of the wheel and is removed with the old assembly. Refer to the B767 Maintenance Manual for wheel spacer installation procedures.

- ... Installation of the new tire was completed without the spacer ring causing the tire, wheel, and brake assembly to be damaged beyond repair. The men changing this tire failed to use proper procedures in the manual and never checked for the spacer ring.
- ... I may have inadvertently left the spacers out of the installation of the new tire and wheel assembly. I do not believe that the spacers were originally there. I followed the maintenance manual card,

which states that there should be a maximum of two to three threads showing. This thread count is maintained even with the spacer missing.

- *... I conferred with the other mechanic and we both agreed that the tire was installed properly. When the aircraft landed at its next destination, the brake on this wheel assembly overheated and the tire deflated... It was noted that the inboard spacer was missing from the assembly... While I had a copy of the maintenance manual, I referred to it only for torque values. I didn't look for this inboard spacer because I wasn't aware of it.*

—ASRS Callback #282, March 2003

ASRS continues to receive reports concerning B767 wheel spacers. (see Callback #282, March 2003). The following two reports shed some light on possible causes for spacer problems on the nose gear.

Even with the proper manuals and paperwork on hand, the spacer on the B767 nose wheels seems to be a trap. It continually sticks to the wheel bearing when the assembly is removed from the aircraft. The 767 has the only nose wheel spacer of [my airline's] fleet types. This and the fact that B767 tires are rarely changed at this station contribute to the spacer being missed.

- *I was notified by my supervisor that an axle spacer was found to be missing on the right side nose tire during the walk-around inspection.... On the B767-300 there are two different axle configurations. One is internally threaded and the other is externally threaded. I did not think the externally threaded axle required a spacer.*
- *According to the air carrier's maintenance manual, wheel spacers are required on both the internally and the externally threaded B767 nose gear axles.*

—ASRS Callback #291, December 2003



請選填下列資料。在收到您的初報後，我們會儘快依照您選擇之聯絡方式與您聯繫。

Please fill out the blanks. TACARE office will contact you via the method chosen.

報告人資料 Information about Reporter

姓名 Name

聯絡電話 Contact Phone ()

職稱 Job Title

服務單位
Firm

航管 ATC 飛航組員 Flt. Crew 空服員 Flt. Attendant 機務 Maintenance 航務 Flt. Ops. 其他 Others

聯絡方式 Preferred Way of Contact

- 打電話給我 call me, 號碼 No.: () _____
- 我來找你們 come to your office, 日期及時間 date & time: _____月 M _____日 D, _____點 H _____分 M
(安排面談確認電話號碼 phone number for appointment confirmation: () _____)
- 已敘述如下，不必再聯絡 Describe as following, no further contact is necessary

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